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Abstract
The recent past has highlighted the influential role of so-
cial networks and online media in shaping public debate on
current affairs and political issues. This paper is focused on
studying the role of politically-motivated actors and their
strategies for influencing and manipulating public opinion on-
line: partisan media, state-backed propaganda, and post-truth
politics. In particular, we present quantitative research on the
presence and impact of these three “Ps” in online Twitter de-
bates in two contexts: (i) the run up to the UK EU member-
ship referendum (“Brexit”); and (ii) the information opera-
tions of Russia-backed online troll accounts. We first com-
pare the impact of highly partisan versus mainstream media
during the Brexit referendum, specifically comparing tweets
by half a million “leave” and “remain” supporters. Next, on-
line propaganda strategies are examined, specifically left- and
right-wing troll accounts. Lastly, we study the impact of mis-
leading claims made by the political leaders of the leave and
remain campaigns. This is then compared to the impact of
the Russia-backed partisan media and propaganda accounts
during the referendum. In particular, just two of the many
misleading claims made by politicians during the referendum
were found to be cited in 4.6 times more tweets than the 7,103
tweets related to Russia Today and Sputnik and in 10.2 times
more tweets than the 3,200 Brexit-related tweets by the Rus-
sian troll accounts.
Introduction
“Post-truth politics” (Higgins 2016) and “weaponized rela-
tivism”1 describe strategies by which misleading informa-
tion can be used to shape debates, redirect attention and sow
confusion in order to influence political outcomes. In re-
cent times, concern has been raised about politicians, foreign
states, and hyper-partisan media exploiting social media to
try and reach out and influence voters and citizens on an un-
precedented scale. Where once social media were heralded
as the beginning of a new age of interactive democracy, the
question in the minds of researchers and many others is
now “can democracy survive the internet” (Persily 2017). A
working theory might postulate that the low bar to publish-
ing created by Web 2.0 has resulted in a number of effects
that we explore here under three headings:
1https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2015/mar/02/guardian-view-
russian-propaganda-truth-out-there
• Partisan media: today’s highly competitive online media
landscape has resulted in poorer quality journalism and
worsening opinion diversity, with misinformation, bias
and factual inaccuracies routinely creeping in. Many out-
lets also resort to highly partisan reporting of key political
events, which can have acrimonious and divisive effects.
• Online propaganda: State-backed (e.g. Russia Today),
ideology-driven (e.g. misogynistic or Islamophobic), or
for-profit clickbait websites and social media accounts
are engaged in spreading manipulative content and disin-
formation often with the intent to deepen social division
and/or influence key political outcomes.
• Post-truth politics, where politicians, parties and govern-
ments frame key political issues in propaganda instead of
facts. Misleading claims are repeated, even when proven
untrue by journalists or independent fact checkers. This
has a highly corrosive effect on public trust and informed
participation in democratic processes.
While researchers have started studying these re-
cently (Skjeseth 2017; Ferrara 2017), the majority of work
has focused primarily on misinformation and fake news dur-
ing elections (Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018; Kaminska,
Kollanyi, and Howard 2017) and the role of bots in spread-
ing it (Shao et al. 2018; Howard and Kollanyi 2016). This
paper presents large-scale, quantitative research on the pres-
ence and impact of these three “Ps” in online Twitter debates
in two contexts: (i) the run up to the UK EU membership
referendum (“Brexit”); and (ii) the information operations
of Russia-backed online troll accounts. The aggregate data
on which this work is based will be made available online
upon publication.
We first compare the impact of highly partisan versus
mainstream media during the Brexit referendum, specifi-
cally comparing tweets by half a million “leave” and “re-
main” supporters. Next, online propaganda strategies are ex-
amined, specifically differentiating left- and right-wing troll
accounts. Lastly, we study the impact of misleading claims
made by the political leaders of the leave and remain cam-
paigns. This is then compared to the impact of the Russia-
backed partisan media and propaganda accounts during the
referendum. In particular, just two of the many mislead-
ing claims made by politicians during the referendum were
found to be cited in 4.6 times more tweets than the 7,103
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tweets related to Russia Today and Sputnik and in 10.2 times
more tweets than the 3,200 Brexit-related tweets by the Rus-
sian troll accounts.
Furthermore, late in 2018 Twitter released a set of nine
million tweets from accounts they have identified as belong-
ing to the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA). The
IRA dataset covers a time period spanning from the begin-
ning of the Ukraine conflict in 2014 through the Brexit refer-
endum and US presidential election until well into President
Donald Trump’s term of office. These data provide rich pos-
sibilities for investigating propaganda. We present here the
first exhaustive analysis of this new dataset, with a focus on
what we can learn about how propaganda succeeds and fails
under the conditions created by modern social media. We
also accurately classify accounts into different activity types
(left trolls, right trolls, etc.), enabling a deeper understand-
ing of how different strategies pay off in terms of impact.
Related Work
The work presented here is set against a backdrop of in-
creasing awareness of the ways in which the internet and
social media are changing society. Social media have been
widely observed to provide a platform for fringe views.
Faris et al (2017) showed that social media seem to amplify
more extreme views, with materials linked on Twitter be-
ing more outre´ than the open web, and on Facebook even
more so, a finding echoed by Silverman (2015). Barbera´ and
Rivero (2015) and Preotiuc-Pietro et al (2017) both show
that Twitter users with more ideologically extreme positions
post more content than those with moderate views.
Researchers also report consistent asymmetries in the
way these changed conditions play out. Allcott and
Gentzkow (2017), during the run-up to the 2016 US pres-
idential election, found 115 pro-Trump fake news stories,
which were shared a total of 30 million times. They found
41 pro-Clinton fake news stories, which were shared a total
of 7.6 million times. This disparity is again echoed in Sil-
verman’s (2015) work. Hare and Poole (2014) find that the
increased separation between American left and right wing
partisans in recent years is accounted for by a right wing
shift to the right; left wing voters have not changed their po-
sition.
There is little evidence of a difference in the way infor-
mation consumers of different political valences respond to
materials that might account for this asymmetry (Faris et al.
2017; Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Instead, Faris et al sug-
gest that in the case of the 2016 presidential election, it was
the cooperative behaviour of pro-Trump media themselves
that led to an advantage, in a phenomenon they dub “net-
work propaganda”. This raises questions about the reach of
such a network or the conditions under which it might arise
elsewhere, and its relationship to political views if any. The
idea of an “alternate reality” created by network propaganda
has implications for social polarization given Lewandowsky
et al’s (2017) observation that where partisans are isolated
in echo chambers extremism is rewarded, as a message may
reach sympathizers without the cost attached in alienating
centric or opposing voters.
A body of work (Lansdall-Welfare, Dzogang, and Cris-
tianini 2016; Mangold 2016) has begun to explore Brexit
opinion and sentiment as expressed on Twitter. Matsuo and
Benoit 2 focus on differences in the dialogue between leave
and remain camps. Moore and Ramsay (2017)’s mostly
manual research is focused on analysing the newspaper me-
dia during the referendum and highlights differences in the
tone of the different campaigns. Our work builds on theirs
by exploring how the behaviour they discuss relates to a
medium’s partisan appeal, as well as focusing on social me-
dia, rather than newspapers.
Howard and Kollanyi (2016) share our interest in propa-
ganda. Our novel contributon is in exploiting large-scale,
reliable voter classification in order to explore partisan dy-
namics and polarisation. Their group have also specifically
investigated Russian bot involvement in Brexit (Narayanan
et al. 2017), but on a significantly smaller scale. Likewise,
Bastos and Mercea (2017) study the impact of bot activity
during Brexit, and present some observations about the na-
ture of the content they spread. They find that such materi-
als are likely to be user-generated, tabloid-style emotionally
orientated materials. The role of Twitter misinformation and
bot activity in the context of the 2016 US presidential elec-
tion has attracted much research attention, as previously dis-
cussed. This has primarily focused on the amount of traffic
generated by bots or trolls, without providing evidence of
impact. In this paper, instead, we focus on quantifying bot
impact and investigating the strategies for achieving it.
The release of the IRA dataset is so recent as to preclude
much in the way of in-depth investigation so far.The largest
prior study available by Linvill and Warren (2018) still had
access to only 3 million tweets, which is very significantly
less than the 9 million just released by Twitter. This new
large corpus constitutes an unprecedented opportunity, since
troll accounts are rapidly suspended by the platform, creat-
ing a moving target for research.
Term Definitions
The politically-motivated actors and strategies that are cen-
tral to this study (partisan media, propaganda, and post-truth
politics) have complex, overlapping characteristics. Figure 1
provides a conceptual diagram of these inter-relationships,
as examined in the scope of this paper. We distinguish ex-
plicitly political vs. apolitical, because although there are
many other cases where propaganda and partisan media play
a significant role, the focus here is on political influences.
The sector of the figure that we are interested in in this work
is the top right; namely, political and less truthful/unbiased,
as we aim to highlight these important new trends in techno-
political sociology. Others3 have explored the “Ps” concept
with more coverage of apolitical motivations.
Inevitably there is overlap and grey areas between the
media and behaviours we discuss in this work. Motivations
2http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/03/
16/more-positive-assertive-and-forward-
looking-how-leave-won-twitter/
3https://medium.com/1st-draft/fake-news-
its-complicated-d0f773766c79
Figure 1: Term Definition and Conceptualisation
for behaviours are unclear; for example, is a popular politi-
cal message in the press intended to influence political out-
comes or sell more newspapers? In this work we confine our
interest to media behaviour that is politically engaged and
misleading. We therefore define:
• Partisan media to to be media presenting themselves as
news, including:
– Partisan press; mainstream media unambiguously
identifying as providers of news reportage, but who
may present partisan materials as more factual than
they really are;
– Alternative media; a broad and varied ecosystem of
new publishers presenting themselves as news, some of
whom are politically partisan and therefore of interest;
• Propaganda to be politically motivated behaviours and
materials with a primary purpose of influencing toward
a particular point of view, see e.g. OED.4 Origin may be
veiled;
• Post-truth politics to be politically motivated output with
little regard for truth and public, political figure or entity
as instigator;
We explore our findings below under these headings.
Methodology
The first corpus used is a large collection of tweets collected
using the GATE Cloud Twitter Collector 5, a tool that al-
lows tweets to be gathered according to search criteria as
they appear, and processed using GATE 6 text processing
pipelines to enrich the tweets with relevant background in-
formation, including the EU membership stance of the au-
thor. The method is described more fully by Maynard et
4http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/152605
5https://cloud.gate.ac.uk/shopfront/
displayItem/twitter-collector
6https://gate.ac.uk/
al (2017). In the next section we describe collecting the
tweets, then after that the user vote intent classification. The
corpus thus enriched was indexed using the Mı´mir search
engine for efficient exploration, which again is described in
more detail by Maynard et al (2017).
The second corpus is Twitter’s IRA data downloaded from
their site.7 We introduce this corpus at the end of this section
and describe how we classified the accounts into six types in-
troduced by Linvill and Warren (2018). These account types
are distinctively different in behaviour, and classifying them
enabled important insights.
Partisanship Attention Score Throughout the work we
make use of Partisanship Attention Score (PAS), first intro-
duced by Faris et al (2017). This metric is a simple ratio
of the number of times a source is linked by one valence
of user, for example leavers, versus the other valence. In
this work we use “leave-PAS” to describe a PAS in which
leave linkers outnumber remain linkers, and “remain-PAS”
to describe a PAS in which remain linkers dominate. We
have grouped sources into five sets; those in which a PAS
is greater than 30:1 (one leave set and one remain set), those
in which the PAS is greater than 3:1 (leave and remain)
and those with a more balanced PAS of less than 3:1. The
30:1 and 3:1 ratios were selected heuristically–throughout
the work we are careful to reflect on how that choice might
affect the results.
Brexit Tweet Collection
Around 17.5 million tweets were collected up to and includ-
ing 23 June 2016 (EU referendum day). The highest volume
was 2 million tweets on Jun 23rd (only 3,300 lost due to
rate limiting), with just over 1.5 million during poll opening
times. Of the 2 million, 57% were retweets and 5% replies.
June 22nd was second highest, with 1.3 million tweets. The
17.5 million tweets were authored by just over 2 million dis-
tinct Twitter users (2,016,896). The work presented here fo-
cuses on a subset of these, covering the month up to and
including June 23rd. Within that period, there were just over
13.2 million tweets, from which 4.5 million were original
tweets (4,594,948), 7.7 million were retweets (7,767,726)
and 850 thousand were replies (858,492). These were sent
by just over 1.8 million distinct users. The tweets were
collected based on the following keywords and hashtags:
votein, yestoeu, leaveeu, beleave, EU referendum, votere-
main, bremain, no2eu, betteroffout, strongerin, euref, bet-
teroffin, eureferendum, yes2eu, voteleave, voteout, notoeu,
eureform, ukineu, britainout, brexit, leadnotleave. These
were chosen for being the main hashtags, and are broadly
balanced across remain and leave hashtags, though the ulti-
mate test of the balance of the dataset lies in the number of
leavers and remainers found in it, which is discussed below.
Most URLs found in tweets have been shortened, ei-
ther automatically by Twitter or manually by the user,
which has the side effect of obfuscating the origi-
nal domain being linked to. For this work we ex-
panded the URLs in tweets using the following ap-
7https://about.twitter.com/en_us/values/
elections-integrity.html#data
proach. From manual analysis of the URLs we accumu-
lated a list of 18 URL shorteners or redirect services:
shr.gs, bit.ly, j.mp, ow.ly, trib.al, tinyurl.com, ift.tt, ln.is,
dlvr.it, t.co, feeds.feedburner.com, redirect.viglink.com,
feedproxy.google.com, news.google.com, www.bing.com,
linkis.com, goo.gl, and adf.ly. All URLs from other domains
were considered to already be expanded. (A small number
of minor URL shorteners have gone unexpanded due to the
long tail in this large tweet set and the necessity of manually
identifying shortening services.) When we saw a shortened
URL it was expanded, either by following HTTP redirects or
using the API of the shortener, recursively until the resulting
URL no longer pointed to a domain in our list of shorteners.
User Vote Intent Classification
Classification of users according to vote intent was done
on the basis of tweets authored by them and identified as
being in favour of leaving or remaining in the EU. Such
tweets were identified using 59 hashtags indicating alle-
giance, given in the online experimental materials8 Hashtags
in the final position more reliably summarise the tweeter’s
position, so only these were used. Consider, for example. “is
Britain really #strongerin? I don’t think so! #voteleave”.
This approach was evaluated using a set of users that ex-
plicitly declared their vote intent. A company called Brnd-
str9 ran a campaign offering a topical profile image modifi-
cation (a flag overlaid on their profile picture) in response to
a formulaic vote intent declaration mentioning their brand.
This enabled a ground truth sample to be easily and accu-
rately gathered. On these data, we found our method pro-
duced a 94% accuracy even on the basis of a single partisan
tweet (where three are required, an accuracy of 99% can be
obtained, though only 60,000 such users can be found, as op-
posed to 290,000 with at least one partisan tweet). The Brnd-
str data itself, consisting of around 100,000 users of each
valence, was also used to supplement the set, raising the ac-
curacy further, and resulting in a list of 208,113 leave voters
and 270,246 remain voters. Table 1 gives detailed statistics
for three conditions; one matching tweet found for that user,
two found or three found. “Total” is the total number of users
found with that number of matching tweets. “Brndstr found”
is the number of those users found in the Brndstr set, and so
able to be evaluated. The remaining figures refer to that set,
providing an accuracy for the total list of users found using
the given minimum number of partisan tweets.
There may be a case for using a threshold of two hashtags
in order to produce a more balanced set of leavers and re-
mainers, but this would disproportionately exclude remain-
ers with more moderate feelings (if the number of hashtags
can be seen as an indicator of this). The resulting set is some-
what slanted toward remainers, demonstrating the obvious;
that Twitter isn’t a representative sample of the UK popula-
tion, who voted to leave the EU to the order of 52%. How-
8http://http://staffwww.dcs.shef.ac.uk/
people/G.Gorrell/publications-materials/
brexit-domains-shared-materials.ods
9http://www.brndstr.com/
Total Brndstr Of found Accuracy Cohen’s
found correct kappa
Leavers, 3# 34539 1142 1129 0.987 0.972
Remainers, 3# 26674 603 594
Leavers, 2# 49080 1368 1350 0.984 0.966
Remainers, 2# 50972 901 882
Leavers, 1# 114519 1935 1801 0.943 0.885
Remainers, 1# 175042 1744 1667
Table 1: Brexit Classifier Accuracy
ever, leavers were more vocal and apparent in the data pre-
sented below, contrary to what we would expect if the higher
number of remainers had affected the result. It is possible
that some users changed their mind about how to vote af-
ter making their Brndstr declaration, but voters making an
online declaration of their vote intent are perhaps those less
likely to vacillate, and the work can in either case be seen as
an exploration of the behaviour of those who held a particu-
lar allegiance during the time period studied.
IRA Corpus and Account Classification
The Twitter IRA corpus10 contains 3,836 unique users and
9,041,308 tweets. The tweets are posted in 57 different lan-
guages, but most of the tweets are in Russian (53.68%) and
English (36.08%), comprising almost 90% of the tweets.
The majority of accounts (as opposed to tweets) are self-
declared English language (2,384), but note that many of
these have Russian display names. Average account age is
around four years, and the longest accounts are as much
as ten years old. Linvill and Warren (2018) have analyzed
the English language accounts and find several key types
of account emerging. A large amount of activity in both
the English and Russian accounts is given to news provi-
sion. Secondly, many accounts seem to engage in hashtag
games, which may be an easy way to establish a history
for an account to make it seem more credible. Of particular
interest however are the political trolls. Left trolls pose as
individuals interested in the Black Lives Matter campaign.
Right trolls are patriotic, anti-immigration Trump support-
ers. Among left and right trolls, several have achieved large
follower numbers and even a degree of fame.11 Finally there
are fearmonger trolls, that propagate scares, and a small
number of commercial trolls. The Russian language ac-
counts may also provide news, or may pose as individuals
with opinions about for example Ukraine or western politics.
These troll types provide insight into how IRA effort was
targeted and to what extent these different behaviour types
translate into impact, such as followers attracted to the ac-
counts and retweets achieved. For this reason we took their
dataset and built a classifier enabling us to classify all the
accounts.
10https://about.twitter.com/en_us/values/
elections-integrity.html#data
11https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
shortcuts/2017/nov/03/jenna-abrams-the-
trump-loving-twitter-star-who-never-really-
existed
Linvill and Warren manually categorized 1,102 IRA-
associated handles into the six categories described above,
providing us with an adequate training set to build a clas-
sifier. 55% of their labelled accounts are right trolls, 20%
are left trolls, 10% are fearmonger and hashtag gamer ac-
counts, 5% are newsfeeds and less than 1% are commercial
accounts. We used a support vector machine (SVM) to pre-
dict the categories of the remaining accounts. Features were
term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf) of En-
glish tweet texts, the domain of shared links including the
domains of the shortened and expanded versions of the links,
and the topic distribution of the tweet text.
We used 75% of the dataset for training and 25% for test-
ing. The F1 score was 0.89, which was also equal to pre-
cision and recall values. The final model was trained on all
data and was used to classify the remaining 2157 accounts
which had English tweets. No attempt was made to classify
an account that had no English language tweets. The result-
ing fully classified dataset contains 60% right trolls, 12%
fearmongers, 11% having no English language tweets, 10%
left trolls, 5% hashtag gamers, 3% newsfeed accounts and
negligible commercial accounts (n=6). The reason for the
change in class proportions is likely to be the criteria that
Linvill and Warren used for selecting accounts to manually
classify. They classified accounts represented in their tweet
set, which was collected via retrospective search on IRA
account names in late 2017, and collected therefore only
tweets still available at that point going back to mid-2015.
We find generally speaking more left and right trolls than in
their sample, and less newsfeeds and hashtag gamers.
Findings
We now present findings under the headings of the three
“Ps”, beginning with partisan media, then moving on to pro-
paganda, then post-truth politics.
Partisan Media
We begin our investigation with the Brexit tweet collection
described above. As a starting point for quantifying the var-
ious influences and evidence of partisanship, the top 100
most posted domains were manually grouped into high level
categories, as shown in figure 2. The dominant domain to
appear was Twitter itself, appearing whenever anyone posts
an image, as well as when they link to another tweet. Af-
ter that, the greater proportion of the links are to items in
a wide variety of mainstream news media. “Other content
hosts” refers to smaller content platforms such as Instagram.
YouTube and Facebook are listed separately. Finally, smaller
amounts of material are linked from referendum campaign
sites and alternative media. (Alternative media range from
publications that are nearly mainstream through to conspir-
acy sites and fake news.) The “long tail” of a further 17,000
less linked domains that haven’t been manually classified
are included in the chart to give a quantification of the un-
known; note that this unknown section is likely to contain
many more small alternative media, blogs etc. than main-
stream media. Also only domains that were tweeted at least
once by a user that has been classified for vote intent were
Figure 2: Types of links posted
included. The actual number of domains mentioned in the
set is much greater. The graph broadly agrees with table 1 of
Narayanan et al (2017). We are also able divide each count
into three parts, indicating the proportion of tweets in that
section by unclassified users, remainers and leavers. It is evi-
dent at a glance that remainers were tweeting less linked ma-
terial, since their representation is smaller. Also there were
fewer remainers in the unclassified tail (that is, the column
of unclassified sites, not the unclassified users), suggesting
perhaps a preference for more popular sites on the part of
remainers. It is unknown how many leavers, remainers and
undecideds constitute the unclassified users (the grey bot-
tom section of the columns) but there’s no particular reason
why the classified users wouldn’t give a representative im-
pression.
PAS of High Impact Media Figure 3 shows the sites that
had the most impact, in terms of total number of times they
appeared in tweets in the Brexit dataset. These were almost
entirely mainstream media, mostly UK media, with the ex-
ception of the remain campaign site “ukstronger.in” and the
UK government domain. The graph gives total counts of ap-
pearances of the most influential domains, colour coded by
partisanship attention score (PAS); the ratio of links from
leave voters to remain voters or vice versa. Platforms such
as Facebook, where the site doesn’t author the content, are
excluded. Only link appearances in original tweets are used
in this graph (not appearances in retweets or replies). Ta-
bles 6 and 7 in the appendix give a longer list of sites. The
full set is also available for download 12
On page 13 of Moore and Ramsay (2017) a similar graph
shows the number of referendum-related articles published
by UK media. The number of Brexit articles published by
a medium shows a strong correlation to its link presence on
Twitter (0.71). In fact, the Express has been somewhat less
taken up on Twitter than its engagement with the subject
12http://http://staffwww.dcs.shef.ac.uk/
people/G.Gorrell/publications-materials/
brexit-domains-shared-materials.ods
Figure 3: Number of appearances of high impact sites
might predict; figure 7 and its discussion later in the paper
may offer further insights on this point.
It is evident that mainstream media were the dominant
source of linked materials in the Brexit discussion on Twit-
ter, with the six most influential domains all being British
mainstream media as shown in figure 3. Smaller in influence
but nonetheless significant were alternative media, with Bre-
itbart appearing in ninth place in figure 3, user-shared con-
tent on other content platforms such as Facebook, and cam-
paign sites. This suggests a continuing important role for
traditional media, though leaves questions about how social
media, and indeed alternative media, may interact to pop-
ularize certain materials and influence the focus. It is also
apparent that the most popular domains were either neutral
in their appeal or appealed to leavers, with only two smaller
sources, the government and the “Stronger In” campaign,
appealing to remainers. This subject is taken up more fully
in the next section.
Ground-Truthing Mainstream Media Figure 4a shows
British mainstream newspapers ranked from left to right in
order of their PAS ratio. For those media with negative leave
PAS ratios, the remain PAS ratio has been plotted (ratio of
appearances in remain tweets against those in leave tweets).
In this way, both leave and remain media can be shown com-
mensurately on the same graph. The point at which the PAS
ratios switch direction is indicated with a vertical arrow. The
extreme right of the graph, therefore, shows the newspaper
with the highest remain PAS ratio (The Guardian/Observer).
Two horizontal lines indicate PAS ratios of 3:1 and 30:1.
PAS ratios for link appearances in all tweets and just origi-
nal tweets are shown.
In figure 4b, the green line indicates the number of up-
held press complaints for that medium. The purple line also
includes the number of complaints for which a resolution
was found. The majority of press complaints regarded arti-
cles that were anti-immigration in their focus.
In figure 4c, newspaper front pages provided by Moore
and Ramsay (2017) for the two month period preceding the
referendum have been manually classified as leave, remain
or neutral in their orientation. An example of a leave front
page might be ”EU ’very bad’ for pensions” (The Express,
June 21st 2016). An example of a remain front page might
Figure 4: PAS (a), Press Complaints (b) and Partisan Front
Page Counts (c) for UK Mainstream News Media
be ”Vote remain today” (The Mirror, June 23rd 2016). Bars
show leave front pages in green and remain in purple. Where
possible, the original article was consulted before classify-
ing a front page. However, in many cases this information
wasn’t accessible. In these cases, a conservative judgment
was reached, but this means that counts for the Sun and the
Independent may be a little depressed, since the full article
usually wasn’t available for them. Note also that the work
was completed by a single annotator, and that in many cases,
classifying the headlines was quite a subtle judgment call.
Several British newspapers declared their allegiances re-
garding Brexit, reportedly giving media supporting the UK
leaving the EU an audience of around 4.8 million, while
those in favour of remaining in the EU reach just over 3
million 13. Stance information is included in figure 4c in
the form of coloured marks–a green square for leave and
a purple circle for remain. Both marks appear for the Mail
because the Daily Mail shares its domain with the Mail on
Sunday. The Daily Mail were in favour of leaving the EU,
and the Mail on Sunday, with a slightly lower circulation,
were in favour of remaining.
PAS was found to correlate with press complaints (0.922,
p<0.001) as well as bias as quantified by the magnitude
of the difference between pro- and anti-Europe front page
counts (0.842, p<0.001).
Figure 4a shows that all of the media that declared their
support for the remain cause were broadly neutral in their
appeal, with the exception of the Guardian/Observer, who,
when retweets and replies are counted, has a leave PAS
greater than 3:1. The media that declared their official sup-
port for leave all to varying extent appealed more to leavers.
This brings to mind Faris et al’s (Faris et al. 2017) conclu-
sion from their study of the 2016 US presidential election
that mainstream media ranging from left to centre right show
more investment in principles of neutrality. The Brexit ques-
tion cut across the political spectrum, although in terms of
media stance, the left-leaning papers favoured remain and
the right, leave. However, it is also possible that leavers en-
gaged with remain materials for other reasons. Press com-
plaints and front page partisanship data provide further in-
sights. It is interesting to note that PAS seems to echo upheld
press complaints better than it does partisanship as indicated
by front pages. There are prominent cases where media pub-
lished many stories in keeping with their Brexit stance, but
without attracting press complaints; most notably the Tele-
graph and the Guardian. Materials supportive of a particular
stance don’t per se seem to draw partisan attention—the PAS
of both these media is low.
This is important in correctly interpreting figure 3. The
medium with the biggest impact is the Guardian, which
published many pro-remain articles. So in this sense, there
wasn’t a lack of attention to pro-remain materials, and if the
colour coding of the graph were based on the “front page
diff” used above, the impression created would be quite dif-
ferent. PAS captures something different. Manual review of
the tweets suggests that Guardian articles tend to be factual
in tone, and attract critical engagement from leavers. Ex-
press articles tend to use emotive and suggestive language,
and seem to attract less discussion. Moore and Ramsay’s
analysis (2017) gives much information about the rhetorical
styles employed by the press in the run-up to the referendum.
Circulation size does not explain the number of complaints
received, with the Express having less than half the reader-
ship of any of the four largest media.14
13https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/
entry/which-newspapers-support-brexit_uk_
5768fad2e4b0a4f99adc6525
14http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/nrs-
national-press-readership-data-telegraph-
overtakes-guardian-as-most-read-quality-
title-in-printonline/
Figure 5: Who are the PAS>30:1 influencers?
Extreme/Affective Materials We saw in section that high
PAS scores show a potential relationship with upheld press
complaints, and that polarity of PAS is a good indicator of
the stance of the source, as determined from press front
pages. We now use PAS scores of greater than 30:1 to se-
lect sources that may be misleading for further examina-
tion. Sites of either camp with at least 1000 total mentions
in tweets in the dataset and at least 50 tweets, retweets or
replies by leavers or remainers were manually analysed. We
present the sites divided into 4 categories; mainstream me-
dia, alternative media, campaign sites and other sites. “Oth-
ers” includes for example personal blogs or special interest
websites not primarily focused on Brexit.
Figure 5 shows that remain PAS>30:1 sites are dom-
inated by explicit campaign sites. As we would expect
given the data above, among leave influencers we see more
mainstream media—note that the only high PAS main-
stream media were leave media; namely the Express. We
also see a much greater role for alternative media in the
leave campaign. The total impact of leave PAS>30:1 me-
dia was 389,000 mentions. For remain it was 70146 men-
tions, or 18% of the PAS>30:1 impact. All sites with a PAS
higher than 30:1 and more than 5000 mentions are shown
in figure 6. The Express dominates, with the US alternative
medium Breitbart in second place. As indicated above, re-
main sites are mainly campaign sites. Other leave sites are
media ranging from alternative to conspiracy, plus the cam-
paign site “voteleavetakecontrol.org”. A longer list can be
found in table 7 in the appendix.
Key observations from figure 5 include that in terms of
mentions in tweets, the influence of leave sites dwarfs that
of remain sites. It is also notable in that figure that high
remain-PAS sites were mostly explicit campaign sites; in
other words, openly partisan, with no suggestion of provid-
ing reportage. The range of media providing high leave-PAS
Figure 6: Who are the PAS>30:1 sites?
Figure 7: All domains vs total mentions by PAS of domain
materials, plus the presence of Breitbart raises the question
of whether these findings demonstrate a similar phenomenon
happening in the UK as described by Faris et al, or whether
indeed it is simply the same phenomenon - an extension of
the same network of propaganda.
Figure 7 presents counts of sites according to their PAS
status. A threshold of 20 total original tweets by leavers and
remainers was applied, in order to exclude sites for which
too little evidence was available to classify them. The graph
shows peaks to either extreme, despite the stringent 30:1
criterion, reinforcing previous researchers’ findings that ex-
treme content tends to proliferate on social media (Faris
et al. 2017; Silverman 2015; Barbera´ and Rivero 2015;
Preot¸iuc-Pietro et al. 2017). The neutral peak most likely
arises because content-neutral platforms such as Facebook
are counted here, rather than because there is a peak in neu-
tral materials such as unbiased news providers. On the right
we see the actual link counts to the sites. Twitter mentions
have not been included, since they give a large, uninforma-
tive boost to the neutral count. Were other content-neutral
platforms to be excluded, this count would be lower still.
Nonetheless, we see that the extremes no longer outnumber
the moderate sites. Evidently most Twitter users prefer less
extreme materials of those on offer. However, this provides
evidence of the diet Twitter is offering.
Online Propaganda
Recall that political propaganda is non-objective informa-
tion, which is aimed at influencing citizens and/or further-
ing a political agenda. In this section we use the Twitter IRA
tweet collection, introduced in Section , to explore evidence
for the impact of different propaganda strategies.
Initially, in the autumn of 2017, Twitter released a list of
around 3,000 Twitter accounts to US Congress that they had
identified as being Russian state-controlled troll accounts,
and had suspended. In the autumn of 2018, the full set of 9
million tweets by these IRA propaganda accounts were re-
leased. The majority of tweets are in Russian as noted above,
primarily with Ukraine-related focus. In contrast, the En-
glish language tweets focus predominantly on US politics.
Prior to the release of the full 9 million tweet set, Linvill
and Warren (2018) researched a partial subset of 3 mil-
lion tweets by most of the IRA accounts, which they gath-
ered and released independently. They found differing pat-
terns of troll activity, with news accounts keeping up a rel-
atively steady output of genuine news and achieving a fair
reach, hashtag trolls showing bursty activity around playing
“hashtag games”15 (i.e., seeking to get many retweets and
favourites through exploiting hashtags), and left and right
trolls being more event-triggered. Political trolls in some
cases achieve a significant following. Examples are given in
table 3, and include both left and right trolls and news feeds.
Figures 9 and 10 give word clouds we generated for the
subset of left and right troll accounts that were manually
identified by Linvill and Warren (2018). Left troll material
has a strong Black issues focus, and often talks about conflict
with the police. Right troll material is political, supportive of
Trump, against the Democrats and anti-Muslim.16 We also
find differences in the web domains left and right trolls tend
to link. The most-linked domains of we found for Linvill and
Warren’s left and right trolls are included in table 8 in the
appendix. Domains intersect with domains linked by leavers
and remainers, as described above and also included in the
appendix. Three sites frequently linked by left trolls appear
on the Brexit list; the Independent, the Huffington Post and
the New York Times. All had a neutral PAS. Three highly
hyperpartisan sites frequently linked by right trolls also ap-
pear on the Brexit list; Breitbart, Infowars and the Express.
All had a leave PAS of greater than 30:1. This suggests an
overlap in outlook between Brexit leave voters and the right
troll persona. Left trolls link neutral sites as well as Black-
focused sites that aren’t relevant to Brexit.
Table 2 gives impact statistics for the different troll types.
First we give average number of tweets, then average num-
ber of original tweets (excluding retweets). Then we report
average number of retweets received, average number of fol-
15https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-
dwoskin/you-should-be-playing-has_b_
7910728.html
16“TCOT” means “Top Conservatives on Twitter”; “PJNET”
means “Patriot Journalist Network”.
Figure 8: Network of IRA Troll Accounts
Figure 9: Left Troll Hashtags
Figure 10: Right Troll Hashtags
Type Number Av Tw Av Orig Retw Rec Av Foll Retw Rat
Right 2194 2560 1436 8710 1609 6.066
Left 339 2755 1025 30121 1815 29.377
Fearmonger 432 487 481 10 62 0.022
Hashtag 189 3041 1582 924 2225 0.584
News 99 9981 9859 13925 9552 1.412
All trolls 3667 2466 1537 8522 1741 5.546
Table 2: Troll Impact
lowers and rate of retweets per original tweet. It is clear that
political trolls achieve by far the best ratio of retweets to
original tweets. Left trolls achieve more retweets per orig-
inal tweet than right trolls, both in terms of mean, shown
in the table, and median (48 vs. 21). However, other ac-
count types are more highly followed, and news and hash-
tag accounts may influence their followers even though their
tweets do not inspire retweets to the same extent. Where
an agent retweets someone else’s tweet rather than author-
ing an original tweet, we don’t have data about how widely
retweeted that tweet was, as it counts for the original au-
thor; it is possible that agents retweeting the tweets of others
are having significant impact in amplifying a message. Of
the account types shown, all have average longevities of ac-
tive life approaching a couple of years with the exception of
fearmonger trolls, where the average duration of active life
(first activity to last activity) is less than six months. Fol-
lower count correlates with retweet rate per original tweet
to the tune of 0.25, which is highly significant, but as we
Figure 11: Timeline of Retweets Achieved by Troll Type
Name Bio Followers Tweets
TEN GOP Unofficial Twitter of Tennessee Republicans. 147,767 10,794
Covering breaking news, national politics,
foreign policy and more. #MAGA #2A
Jenn Abrams Calm down, I’m not pro-Trump. I am pro- 79,152 25,378
common sense. Any offers/ideas/questions?
DM or email me jennnabrams@gmail.com
(Yes, there are 3 Ns)
Pamela Moore13 Southern. Conservative. Pro God. Anti 72,121 6,203
Racism
TodayNYCity New York City’s local news on Twitter. 66,980 59,420
Breaking news, sports, events and
international news. Tweet us or DM
ELEVEN GOP This is our back-up account in case 59,279 115
anything happens to @TEN GOP
wokeluisa APSA. #Blackexcellence. Political science 57,295 2,288
major
Crystal1Johnson It is our responsibility to promote the positive 56,581 7,915
things that happen in our communities.
SouthLoneStar Proud TEXAN and AMERICAN patriot #2a 53,999 3,600
#prolife #Trump2016 #TrumpPence16 Fuck
Islam and PC. Don’t mess with Texas!
Table 3: High Impact IRA Trolls
see, different types of tweeting behaviour produce different
profiles in terms of being followed and being retweeted.
In figure 11 we see a timeline of retweets achieved
for the different types of trolling behaviour. This
gives an indicator of the effectiveness of the different
troll types. The figure is available in interactive form
at https://gate.ac.uk/ira/retweet_counts_
excluding_from_trolls.html. It is notable that po-
litical trolls are achieving many more retweets than any other
type, with the others barely appearing in the graph. Retweets
by other IRA trolls have been removed from these counts. As
a whole, IRA trolls have not tended to retweet each other a
great deal; 27% of retweets in the corpus are of other trolls,
but this was extremely variable; right trolls retweeted each
other significantly until the end of 2016 then stopped. Hash-
tag gamers do retweet each other to a minor extent.
Figure 8 gives a network diagram of only trolls with more
than 5,000 followers. Connections are based on the trolls
mentioning, retweeting, replying to or quoting each other,
not whether they follow each other, as we do not have ac-
cess to that information in the dataset released by Twit-
ter. “Not English” accounts are mostly Russian, and con-
sist of a large number of newsfeed accounts (“novosti”) as
Figure 12: Timeline of Tweet Activity
When Lang Tweet Total % Retw Retw Rec Retw Rat
17-20 Jun 2014 Rus 118,219 17% 30,365 0.31
8-10 Oct 2014 Rus 70,233 44% 22,572 0.57
17-19 Mar 2015 Eng 57,710 1% 637 0.01
23-25 Nov 2015 Rus 28,252 72% 38,760 4.90
5-7 Oct 2016 Eng 31,111 90% 121,117 38.93
11-18 Aug 2017 Eng 95,112 2% 297,960 3.20
Table 4: Statistics of Tweet Spikes
well as others. The figure is available in interactive form at
https://gate.ac.uk/ira/network/.
In the following subsections we discuss a selection of
cases illustrating different aspects of the dataset that shed
light on some aspect of online propaganda. We discuss
prominent “spikes”; brief periods of much escalated tweet-
ing. We also briefly cover an attempt at a “scare” from 2014,
before concluding with an analysis of the relevance of Rus-
sian Twitter propaganda to Brexit.
Cases There are three prominent spikes in activity among
English language tweets, and three among the Russian ones,
as can be seen in figure 12. The figure is available in inter-
active form at https://gate.ac.uk/ira/daily_
tweets.html. The first and greatest of the English spikes
shows little in the way of meaningful content. Impact
(retweets) in this period was negligible despite a high num-
ber of original tweets. The second was timed well, in Octo-
ber 2016, as an attempt to influence Americans who would
go to the polls to elect a new president the following month.
The final of three spikes in English language tweets oc-
curred in August 2017 and focuses on the incidents in Char-
lottesville.17 Table 4 gives an overview of the spikes. “%
Retw” gives the percentage of the tweets that were retweets
of others, whereas “Retw Rec” gives number of times these
tweets were retweeted, and “Retw Rat” gives number of
times each tweet was retweeted.
31,111 tweets were found in the set between October 5th
17https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unite_the_
Right_rally
and 7th 2016, which constituted the second largest English
language “spike” in the dataset. It is evident in the table that
the number of these tweets that were retweets was high, and
at 90% much higher than the corpus-wide average rate of
38%. In the two day window from October 5th to 7th, almost
half the tweets originated in the most active twenty accounts
and consisted almost entirely of retweets. These accounts
had on average 1,300 followers each. Prominent trolls con-
tinued their activity as usual during this period, and the top
15, which each had more than 500 retweets and are famil-
iar, established accounts such as “TEN GOP” and “Crys-
tal1Johnson”, achieved 98% of retweets (of original tweets)
in this period. The retweet rate of original tweets in this
period was 39 retweets per original tweet, which is much
higher than the corpus-wide retweet rate of 3.46 retweets
per original tweet. It is possible that the retweeting activity
boosted the impact of the original tweets during this time;
however the retweet quality is generally low and the retweets
were not generally of other troll accounts. It is perhaps more
likely that the political climate in this period enabled skilled
political trolls to be particularly effective.
In the Charlottesville spike we again see the overwhelm-
ing majority of retweets achieved by a handful of promi-
nent trolls. 97% of retweets were achieved by the 19 trolls
with retweet counts over 500. Among those 19 we see famil-
iar faces, who continued to operate as usual and with their
usual high impact, most notably “TEN GOP” who achieved
130,000 retweets in that period. However there is also a pres-
ence of a cluster of accounts that became active at the end
of July 2017 and remained active for short durations only,
often posing as patriotic, Trump-supporting individuals and
notably giving as their profile URL a link to “ReportSe-
cret.com”, a now-defunct alternative news site also run by
the Internet Research Agency. During the Charlottesville pe-
riod, one of these accounts achieved 21,000 retweets, a re-
turn of four retweets per tweet, particularly notable given
that the account was active for only eighteen days. The tone
of the material is pro-Trump, consisting of a fair percentage
of skilled original tweets, and retweets that are consistent
with the message so likely to be manual. 65% of tweets in
this period originated in accounts with “ReportSecret.com”
profile URLs. This operation was probably more expensive,
and whilst the retweet per original tweet rate was typical for
the corpus, by far the highest total number of retweets was
achieved of all the spikes, whilst succeeding in scaling up
beyond the handful of established, popular trolls and gain-
ing significant impact with new accounts.
In contrast, a tweet set from a single day in Septem-
ber 2014 illustrates perhaps a further early unsuccessful at-
tempt at influence. 8,520 tweets in total contained the hash-
tag “#ColumbianChemicals” and spread false rumours of
an accident at a US chemical plant, and consisted of 275
tweets in Russian, most of which came earliest in the day,
3,119 tweets targeted at prominent individuals that achieved
just eight retweets, 3,821 original tweets that achieved 1360
retweets, and 1305 retweets by the IRA trolls themselves,
accounting for most of the retweets of original tweets. This
attempt at a scare clearly fell flat. Here is an example tweet
from the set:
Account Orig. tweets Retweeted Retweets Replies Total
@RT com 39 2,080 62 0 2,181
@RTUKnews 78 2,547 28 1 2,654
@SputnikInt 148 1,810 3 2 1,963
@SputnikNewsUK 87 206 8 4 305
TOTAL 352 6,643 101 7 7,103
@Vote leave 2,313 231,243 1,399 11 234,966
@StrongerIn 2,462 132,201 910 7 135,580
Table 5: Russian Account Activity vs Campaign Sites
@BarackObama Barack , Are you kidding?? I saw the
video #ColumbianChemicals and it looks like hell!!!
What a nightmare!
IRA and Brexit With regards to Brexit, we looked at
tweets posted by the accounts in our own Brexit tweet
dataset in a one month period before the referendum. Fur-
thermore, using our data, a further forty-five troll accounts
were able to be identified and subsequently suspended by
Twitter, in work described by Buzzfeed News.18 Influence
by those accounts was modest. Amongst the 3,200 total
tweets, 830 came from the 45 newly identified accounts
(26%). Brexit interest in the new corpus echoed previous
findings provided in the Buzzfeed article showing little inter-
est in advance of the referendum and a peak on the day of the
referendum almost entirely in foreign languages (German).
Table 5 shows all tweets posted one month before 23 June
2016, which were either authored by Russia Today or Sput-
nik, or are retweets of these. This gives an indication of how
much activity and engagement there was around these ac-
counts. To put these numbers in context, the table also in-
cludes the equivalent statistics for the two main pro-leave
and pro-remain Twitter accounts. It is evident that influence
was modest.
Automation in the Brexit Tweets Automation is another
area of concern with regards to propaganda, as it may be
used to increase reach at low cost. We saw evidence above
suggesting that it is difficult to achieve a high impact with
automated accounts. However, other research finds a role for
automated accounts in information spread (Shao et al. 2018).
With regards to Brexit, whilst it is hard to quantify automa-
tion among the accounts, Bastos and Mircea (2017) iden-
tified 13,493 suspected bot accounts, among which Twitter
found only 1% to be linked to Russia. In our Brexit dataset
there are tweets by 1,808,031 users in total, which makes
these bot accounts only 0.74% of the total. If we consider
Twitter accounts that have posted more than 50 times a day
(widely considered to indicate a high degree of automation),
then there are only 457 such users in the month leading up to
the referendum on 3 June 2016. The most prolific accounts
were ”ivoteleave” and ”ivotestay”, both suspended, which
were similar in usage pattern. There were also a lot of ac-
counts that did not really seem to post much about Brexit
18https://www.buzzfeed.com/tomphillips/we-
found-45-suspected-bot-accounts-sharing-
pro-trump-pro
but were perhaps using the hashtags in order to gain atten-
tion for commercial reasons. We also analysed the leaning
of these 457 high automation accounts and identified 361 as
pro-leave (with 1,048,919 tweets), 39 pro-remain (156,331
tweets), and the remaining 57 as undecided. This leaning
towards leave echoes our above findings that the leave cam-
paign was much more vocal on Twitter.
Post-Truth Politics–A Tale of Two Claims
The rise of post-truth politics has been linked to the low-
ered bar to publication offered by Web 2.0 and the conse-
quent momentum that can be gained for organized disinfor-
mation campaigns (Faris et al. 2017). A House of Commons
Treasury Committee Report published on May 2016, states
that: “The public debate is being poorly served by inconsis-
tent, unqualified and, in some cases, misleading claims and
counter-claims. Members of both the ‘leave’ and ‘remain’
camps are making such claims.” We analysed the number
of Twitter posts around some of the these disputed claims.
A study of the news coverage of the EU Referendum cam-
paign established that the economy was the most covered
issue, and in particular, the remain claim that Brexit would
cost households £4,300 per year by 2030 and the leave cam-
paign’s claim that the EU cost the UK £350 million each
week. Therefore, we focused on these two key claims and
analysed tweets about them.
With respect to the disputed £4,300 claim19 (made by
the Chancellor of the Exchequer), we identified 2,404 posts
in our dataset (tweets, retweets, replies), referring to this
claim. For the £350 million a week disputed claim20 there
are 32,755 pre-referendum posts (tweets, retweets, replies)
in our dataset. This is 4.6 times the 7,103 posts related to
Russia Today and Sputnik and 10.2 times more than the
3,200 tweets by the Russia-linked accounts suspended by
Twitter.
In particular, there are more than 1,500 tweets from dif-
ferent voters within our sample, with one of these wordings:
I am with @Vote leave because we should stop send-
ing £350 million per week to Brussels, and spend our
money on our NHS instead.
I just voted to leave the EU by postal vote! Stop
sending our tax money to Europe, spend it on the NHS
instead! #VoteLeave #EUreferendum
Many of those tweets have themselves received over a
hundred likes and retweets each. This false claim is popu-
larly regarded as one of the key ones behind the success of
the leave campaign. Regarding the impact of these claims, a
potentially useful indicator comes from an Ipsos Mori poll
published on 22nd June 2016, which showed that for 9% of
respondents the NHS was the most important issue in the
campaign.
19https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-
institute/CMCP/UK-media-coverage-of-the-
2016-EU-Referendum-campaign.pdf
20https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/policy-
institute/CMCP/UK-media-coverage-of-the-
2016-EU-Referendum-campaign.pdf
The leave claim notably appeared as a bus advert, so
spreading its message to the voting public via a different
channel. To assess the impact of this, the number of appear-
ances of pictures of the red bus in our sample was counted;
a high recall OCR step was followed by a manual classifica-
tion to find these images. 913 images of the bus were found.
Furthermore, 21,240 appearances of the leave claim in some
form of image were found, using a fully automated OCR
method with an F1 of 0.87, substantially increasing the tex-
tual count for that claim. Moore and Ramsay (2017) state
that the remain claim was discussed in 365 newspaper arti-
cles, whereas the leave claim was discussed in only 147. The
greater media interest in the Osborne claim is unsurprising
given his position of authority, but this didn’t translate into
interest on Twitter.
Note that not all Twitter discussion of the misleading
headlines is uncritical propagation. The tweets often talk
about the credibility of the headline. The 21,240 leave claim
images were tweeted by 16,490 unique users. Of those, a
higher number were remainers (5,369 vs. 4,950, with the
remainder unclassified), suggesting a high proportion of
Twitter interest in the claim was at least somewhat criti-
cal. Note also that although pictorial versions of the claim
were tweeted by more remainers, the leavers that did tweet it
tweeted it more; in terms of actual tweets containing pictures
making the claim (buses as well as other imagery contain-
ing the claim) leavers accounted for 7531, compared with
6585 remainers, with the remainder unclassified, suggesting
a greater enthusiasm for sharing the imagery among leavers,
as one might expect. Recall that as we found above, our
sample contains more remainers, but the leavers were more
vocal. These findings recall Venturini (2019), who notes
that the spreading of information is largely independent of
whether the spreader actually believes it, and that this viral
tendency and the resulting deluge of valueless information
may be the more significant aspect of the problem. A simi-
lar result is found when considering another prominent pic-
torial campaign; the UK Independence Party’s poster show-
ing a large queue of people alongside the slogan “Breaking
Point” and the suggestion that “we must take back control of
our borders”. The poster has been criticised for implying that
the people in the poster are entering the UK as immigrants,
whereas in fact the picture was taken in Slovenia 21. This
claim was found in 3,388 tweets in pictorial form, of which
leavers account for 948 and remainers, 1,007, the greater
number, and the rest unclassified. In terms of unique users,
843 leavers posted the claim in image form and 890 remain-
ers did so (1,331 unclassified). It is evident from the above
that in this case, remainers repeated the leave claim more
than leavers.
Discussion
We have presented evidence addressing the presence of par-
tisan media, propaganda and post-truth politics in the run-up
to the UK EU membership referendum on Twitter and in the
21https://www.theguardian.com/politics/
2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-
breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants
media, as well as more broadly. With regards to partisanship
in Brexit, we saw that websites linked in topically related
tweets were most often neutral or bipartisan in their appeal.
However, sources with partisan appeal also captured a size-
able portion of the debate, and of those, the leave-partisan
materials were much more heavily propagated. Mainstream
media with a stated remain stance produced materials ap-
pealing to both sides of the debate. Some mainstream media
with a stated leave stance produced materials predominantly
appealing to leavers.
A high degree of imbalance between leavers and remain-
ers in those linking to a medium’s website was found to
suggest partisanship or even propaganda; materials with a
strong appeal to leavers rather than remainers were plenti-
ful and diverse, and included mainstream media and alterna-
tive media including US and other foreign sources. Materials
with a strong appeal to remainers were fewer and less influ-
ential, and mainly comprised explicit campaign sites. Num-
ber of upheld press complaints correlates more strongly with
a site’s partisan appeal than the bias of the source as deter-
mined by the difference between its pro- and anti-Europe
front pages (though both correlations are highly significant),
suggesting that partisan appeal is capturing something other
than the extent to which a source provides a voice for a par-
ticular opinion, and that misinformation may be a part of it.
Evidence of Russian state involvement was modest. Auto-
mated accounts were in evidence.
The main evidence presented regarding propaganda was
taken from a dataset identified by Twitter as originating
in the Russian Internet Research Agency, an organization
known to seek global influence through the dissemination
of propaganda materials. Observation of this data suggests
a learning process on their part regarding how impact can
effectively be achieved. Tapping into deeply felt issues such
as Black equality and patriotism has allowed a few skilled
agents to build a large following, accounting for by far the
greater part of the IRA’s reach. The appetite of the audience
for a particular message might therefore be seen as the “Tro-
jan Horse”, via which the desired message may then be in-
sinuated. Indeed some difficulty may arise in distinguishing
the vehicle message from the propagandistic message that
motivates the efforts. A good vehicle may bide its time, or
indeed be an end in itself (for example leading to financial
benefit through advertising revenue).
Low effort approaches, such as possibly automated
retweeting and large scale tweeting of pleasing but vague
content, didn’t appear to result in a high reach. One observed
case of a fabricated scare fell entirely flat. Whilst success
to very great extent is in the hands of a handful of highly
skilled political trolls, scaling up reach beyond a few estab-
lished popular accounts was achieved in conjunction with
the events at Charlottesville in 2017. The material appears
to be skilled and probably not automated. Future work ex-
ploiting this corpus should involve a deeper review of the
Russian language IRA tweets. This would provide a greater
understanding of the early history of an internet propaganda
operation. Linked materials also provide more detailed ma-
terial. The website “ReportSecret.com” has been highlighted
above, along with other partisan press and alternative media
in reference to the Brexit case. Furthermore the Russian ac-
counts linked thousands of times to pages on the website
LiveJournal, where extensive material more in the nature of
personal opinion achieved a high reach; most-linked pages
discuss the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17,
and are pro-Russian, anti-Ukraine. The material has pro-
vided an opportunity to benefit from the IRA’s learning pro-
cess in understanding how messages spread or fail to spread.
However, the observations made here are preliminary only,
and must form part of a more rigorous and complete picture
formed of all available data, not just part, and backed up by
controlled studies.
Claims made by leave and remain campaigns were re-
viewed in the context of post-truth politics. Echoing find-
ings above, uptake of misleading leave claims was found to
be high, dwarfing, for example, any evidence of Russian in-
fluence on Brexit. The greater hazard for public information
may be the increasing tendency for public figures to take lib-
erties with the truth.
A background issue through the findings is the issue of
polarization. In the section on partisan media we found that
the pro-remain Guardian newspaper attracted critical com-
ment, which the Express did not do to the same extent, in-
stead attracting upheld press complaints. This raises ques-
tions about the factors that encourage, or discourage, bipar-
tisan discussion. Highly partisan materials were found to
be evident in great quantities in the form of linked mate-
rials in the Brexit tweet sample. Whilst these materials are
of concern in that they are prolific and more often mislead-
ing, and are attracting significant attention, information con-
sumers show a preference for linking more moderate mate-
rials, supporting previous research suggesting that there is
a polarizing pull from those putting out their message on
the internet. In the IRA materials we found that political
trolls attracted the greatest following and achieved the great-
est impact pushing at a small number of what might be seen
as “open doors”; topics where feelings are already running
high. These existing cracks in society may offer opportuni-
ties for those that wish to create further division.
The release of the IRA dataset by Twitter is an impor-
tant step forward in platforms working together with scien-
tists to enable a better understanding of the new social dy-
namic they have created. Controversial posts and accounts
are suspended at a very high rate, creating an issue for
open and repeatable science on social media data. However
the dataset was limited in that follower/followee networks
weren’t included. Gaining a full picture requires access to
all related data, not only tweets from a particular set of ac-
counts. Similarly the impact of retweets cannot be under-
stood without information about the retweet rate of retweets.
Fully understanding impact requires information about how
often a tweet appeared on someone’s screen. Moving for-
ward requires a careful debate about privacy. Failing to have
that debate may result in information being richly available
to those with commercial objectives, namely the platforms
themselves, but denied to a society reeling from the effects.
As already discussed above, disinformation and biased
content reporting are not just the preserve of fake news and
state-driven propaganda sites and social accounts. A sig-
nificant amount also comes from media and factually in-
correct statements by prominent politicians. The impact of
widely known and influential claims made by politicians
from both sides of the referendum campaign was already
discussed above. Therefore, effectively combating deliber-
ate online falsehoods must address such cases. Furthermore
transparency in political advertising on social platforms and
a review process for political advertising are likely to help
with reducing the impact of all other kinds of disinforma-
tion already discussed above (i.e. fake news sites, Russian
propaganda, etc).
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Appendix
Remain PAS>3:1 Total Neutral Total Leave PAS>3:1 Total
gov.uk 63119 twitter.com 4018371 Youtube 226382
theconversation.com 8495 The Guardian 253474 The Telegraph 148565
internacional.elpais.com 6915 BBC 242131 Daily Mail 86888
blogs.lse.ac.uk 6532 Facebook 109552 Bloomberg 53071
jkrowling.com 5975 The Independent 104572 news.sky.com 32016
economist.com 5220 amp.twimg.com 80727 The Sun 30255
eureferendum.gov.uk 4095 Reuters 71776 snpy.tv 28281
timeshighereducation.com 3738 wp.me 58287 Russia Today 23064
politics.co.uk 3344 Financial Times 44497 cnn.it 22617
politicalscrapbook.net 3266 mirror.co.uk 43467 on.wsj.com 20332
secure.avaaz.org 3159 buff.ly 40646 itv.com 17200
leftfootforward.org 3014 paper.li 39458 on.mktw.net 16838
touchstoneblog.org.uk 2655 New York Times 38441 blogs.spectator.co.uk 13298
zeit.de 2476 Huffington Post 33697 cnb.cx 12946
snp.org 2455 econ.st 29956 forbes.com 11967
tagesschau.de 2396 The Times 25519 yhoo.it 7955
cer.org.uk 2216 cards.twitter.com 21589 Sputnik 7032
greenpeace.org.uk 2078 standard.co.uk 15335 reportuk.org 6712
lavanguardia.com 2049 instagram.com 14671 IBT 6577
birminghammail.co.uk 1856 El Economista 13665 marketwatch.com 6090
Table 6: PAS>3:1 Sites and Sites with Neutral Appeal
Remain PAS>30:1 Total Leave PAS>30:1 Total
ukstronger.in 39221 express.co.uk 168846
prt.news 20452 breitbart.com 55493
virg.in 11708 zerohedge.com 20531
strongerin.co.uk 10672 Heat Street 14889
infacts.org 8165 voteleavetakecontrol.org 14235
ebx.sh 4670 order-order.com 12804
voteremain.win 2567 infowars.com 7306
unite4europe.org 1554 to-go.xyz 6107
owl.li 1462 dld.bz 5561
energydesk.greenpeace.org 1169 guyfawk.es 5072
scotlandineurope.eu 1166 specc.ie 4709
weareeurope.org.uk 1151 telegraaf.nl 4659
realnewsuk.com 1070 dailysquib.co.uk 4396
euromove.org.uk 968 davidicke.com 4184
bmj.com 900 twibble.io 4138
neweuropeans.net 788 brexitthemovie.com 3997
greens.scot 741 eureferendum.com 3673
richardcorbett.org.uk 712 au.news.yahoo.com 3447
uktostay.eu 696 indiegogo.com 3369
chokkablog.blogspot.co.uk 691 live.pollstation.com 3269
Table 7: PAS>30:1 Sites
Left Trolls Total Right Trolls Total
twitter.com 11132 twitter.com 2042
blackmattersus.com 1788 facebook.com 593
blacktolive.org 1572 breitbart.com 473
goo.gl 844 youtube.com 419
instagram.com 614 washingtonpost.com 275
youtube.com 482 foxnews.com 165
tribpub.com 279 thegatewaypundit.com 155
bb4sp.com 261 jihadwatch.org 117
medium.com 243 dailymail.co.uk 114
independent.co.uk 237 cnn.com 112
huffingtonpost.co.uk 230 dailycaller.com 92
theroot.com 182 medium.com 91
vine.co 176 nytimes.com 88
facebook.com 143 jennabrams.com 63
rawstory.com 140 nypost.com 63
thefreethoughtproject.com 118 infowars.com 61
washingtonpost.com 115 vine.co 60
tumblr.com 98 express.co.uk 57
atlantablackstar.com 94 tribpub.com 54
nytimes.com 89 thehill.com 48
Table 8: IRA Political Troll Most Linked Sites
